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BLACK TRADE UNIONISM DURING THE SECOND WORLD 
WAE - THE WITWATERSRAND STRIKES OF DECEMBER 1942 
Mark Stein 
During the Second World War black trade unionism expanded very rapidly. According to 
available estimates, on the Witwatersrand alone the number of unions rose from twenty 
with 23,000 members in 1940 to fifty with 80,000 members in 1945. (1) The war-time 
level of strike action was higher than during the 1930s, but its scale 1m.s far smaller 
than one might have expected considering the proportions reached by the union movement. 
Tne largest war-time outbreak of black strike action was in December 1942, involving 
over 8,000 workers from several Witwatersrand industries. This was the largest outbreak 
in the whole country between the two gold miners' strikes of February 1920 and August 
1946 
In %his paper I will endeavour to answer four questions. Firstly, how did 
government labour policy respond to the particular pressures created by World War Two? 
Secondly, how did Vne Wage Board's policy unintentionally provoke the December 1942 ' 
strikes? Thirdly, how smccessfd were the strikes? Fourthly, why did they liot recur 
for the rest of the war? 
With regard to the first question, there was no sudden break between war- 
time labour policy twd that of the second half of the 1930s. Before the war the Labour 
Department had encouraged black unions in certain industries where the black workers 
were mostly skilled or semi-skilled and permanently urbanized. This encouragement took 
the form of wage increases awarded by the Wage Board and Labour Department assistance 
with the enforcement of legal minimum wages. Its object was to prevent strike action 
which might be successful and spread to the unskilled migrant majority of the black 
labour force, especially the gold miners. One sign of the success of this policy was 
that between 1937 and 1940 Max Gordonls unions (the largest group) did not call a 
single strike. (2) During 1928-1929 the black clothing union had been very militant, 
but by the late 1930s it was a passive appendage of the white union. (3) 
For the unskilled migrant majority of the black labour force the state had 
almost nothing to offer besides such acts of repression as the tightening up of influx 
control by the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act and the empty promise of more land in 
the reserves. The government's policy can be seen as designed to co-opt one section of 
the black working class so as to repress the rest, especially the gold miners, more 
effectively. (1t was a partial implementation of the proposals of the 1930-1932 Native 
Economic Commission, which recommended higher wages for the skilled and semi-skilled 
urbanized minority plus the reduction of the number of unskilled migrants in the towns, 
not by tighter influx control but by the resuscitation of agriculture in the 
-
reserves. ) (4) 
The nature of the wa.r-time economy - rapid inflation, a large eqansion of 
manufacturing output and labous shortage resulting from militmy recruitment - obliged 
the govemen.t to raise black wages. (5) But in doing so it initia.lly followed the 
lines of its pre-war policy. %'or the first three years of the war the government 
refused to give any increase to the gold miners. They were excluded from the cost of 
living allowance received by white workers and blacks in commerce m d  industry. They 
were also excluded from the Wage Board programme. 
The most important war-time W a g e  Board investigation was that into Unskilled 
Labour, Witwatersrand and Pretoria, which white liberals had been requesting since at 
least 1935. Commencing in mid-1941, this investigation covered 47,000 workers in 
thirty-four industries. It ended in Wage Determination 105, which fixed a nairaimum wage 
of 25/- per week, rising to 27/- over two years, and came into force on 30th November 
1942. This wage was almost double the average wage on the gold mines. The fixing of 
such a wage reflected official recognition of the fact that a lax@, and increasing, 
percentage of those employed in commerce and in&ustzy were pemmently urbanized. 
However, it fell well below the wage - about 37/6 per week - which the Smit Report at 
the end of 1942 calculated as the poverty datum line for an average urban African 
family. (6) Presumably the state expected black labourers and their families to endure 
poverty conditions, although the basic wage would have been supplemented to some extent 
by overtime and the earnings of wives and children. 
During the first two and a half years of the war the black U o n  movement 
expanded but the level of strike action remained quite low. During this period - as 
later - the black unions repeatedly complained that wage increases were inadequate 
and/or slow to materialize. The African Dairy Workers 8 Union - for example - reminded 
the Wage Board in September 1941 that since the union" f~mx%t,ion in 1938 
P/lany times !the Dairy workers were on the point of 
coming out on strike because their employers refused 
to discuss their grievances with the Unioaz9s 
representatives, but they did not do so a,s they were 
put off by promises that the Wage B o d  would attend 
to their complaints. (7) 
During 1939 they had been told that they would be covered by Wage 
Determination 70 for the commercial distributive trade. But when %he employers 
protested that they could not afford to pqy labomers 27/8 per week, %he dairy workers 
were excluded and promised a separate Wage Board investigation. 
Again 'the game of hide and seek' was played with 
the workers. Tney were told 'Do not strike, the Wage 
Board will settle your grievances ... q u t  a year and 
a half passed before the Wage Board's Recommendation 
was gazetted, and in the meanwhile Dairy Workers ... 
reached the utmost limit of their patience and 
endurance ... Rather than accept the Board's proposals 
they are prepared to strike . . . ( 8 )  
Yet it was not until December 1942 - fifteen months later - that this strike threat 
was fulfilled. This well illustrates the reluctance of black unions to resort to 
strike action, *ich was not only illegal but would jeopardize the union's relationship 
with the Labour Department. 
Table 1 
14.9.42 to 14.10.42 Johannesburg sweet workers strike (600 whites and 400 blacks) 
19.10.42 40 strike at Gemiston coal yard 
20.10.42 600 at Kazerne railWr yard 
6.11.42 Wage Determination 105, Unskilled Work, Witwatersrand aYld Pretoria, 
published. 
30.11.42 Wage Determination 105 comes into effect 
1.12.42 1,400 dairy workers strike 
8.12.42 2,000 municipal workers strike 
strike at Rand PIlning Timber 
9.12.42 500-600 strike at Van Beek St. municipal compound, Johannesburg. 
13.12.42 general meeting of African Motor Industry Workers' Union issues 
strike threat 
14.12.42 strikes by 800 clay workers 
150 at Suncrush (mineral water) 
1,000 in wholesale meaurade 
17.12.42 900 strike in retail meat trade 
19.12.42 War Measure No. 145 
21.12.42 iron and steel workers reported to be threatening to strike 
28.12.42 Pretoria municipal workers riot over wages - 17 killed 
( ~ n  an unknown date in December 1942 there was a strike - or threat of one - in the 
power indw try. ) 
7.1.43 500 strike at LangZaagte mine compound 
13.1.43 29 milling workers strike 
16.1.4.3 60 on hunger strike at Rosheriille power station (VFP CO) 
12.2.43 &.ad Water Board agrees to observe Wage Determination 105 (100 per 
cent increase) 
How did Wags Board policy (unintentionally) provoke the December 1942 
strikes? l"& answer is divided into four points, the first of which is the lowness 
of the minimum fixed by Wage Determination 105. Mayly strikers asked for no more than 
this minimum, but for others, especially the meat workers, it represented no increase 
on existirig rates. (Meat workers! wages were relatively high because of %he success 
of their ?don in negotiating wage increases for them during 1941.) (9) 
The second point is that dairy workers in September 1942 and municipal 
workers in November 1942 had had wage increases revoked because of pressure from 
white interests. Immediately after the dairy wage determination had been published - 
three years after the black workers had first been promised it - the Minister of 
Labour suspendled it on the pounds that it not clear whether the exclusion of all 
farming operations from the scope of the Wage Act rendered it impossible for the 
detemirmtion to apply to farmers who engaged in the dairy trade (producer- 
distributors). Other traders argued that if producer-distributors were exclu3,ed from 
the wage determination, by paying lower wages and charging lower prices they would be 
able to drive their competitors out of business. To protect them from this the dairy 
wage determination was suspended altogether. (10) Municipal workers were the only 
large group for which Wage Determination 105 had brought about a substantial increase: 
11,330 Jo2aannesburg workers got 33 per cent extra (8/6 per week) and 6,800 
Witwatersrand and 3,172 Pretoria workers got 30 and 33 per cent, respectively. (11) 
The extra annual cost imposed on Johannesburg alone was £300,000-£400,000. It would 
appear that the Wage Board imposed this drastic increase because, unlike other 
industries, municipalities do not produce for profit in a competitive market, and 
the burden would be spread over the whole rate-paying community. The municipal 
representatives were, however, able to convince the 14inister that their towns could 
not afford to implement the wage determination immediately, and he w e d  to suspend 
it in their case until the beginning of the next financial year. (12) 
The third point is that workers in certain industries - mining timber, 
clay, power, water - were bitterly dissatisfied with being excluded from Wage 
Determination 105. The reason for their exclusion appears to have been that they 
were largely unskilled migrants paid on the same level as the gold miners. (13) In . 
accounting for the unrest in these industries one must bear in mind that, altho* it 
was predominantly intended to assist peraanently urbanized workers, many of those 
covered by Wage Determination 105 were unskilled migrants. (A* a time when 
urbanization was proceeding virtually unchecked, the state possessed no means for 
distinguishing between the two groups,) Thus the state was giving an increase to some 
unskilled migrants but not to others. 
Fourthly, the fact that Wage Determimtion 105 applied to so large a section 
of the black labour force ensured that its coming into force on 30th November 1942 
would bring unrest to a head among the different groups of workers who wanted more 
money but for various reasons did not benefit from Wags Determination 105. 
The degree of success obtained by the strikers can be attributed to four 
interrelated factors: non-availability of alternative labour; violent picketing; 
police restraint; and the role of the black union leadership. 
1 
War-time labour demands meant that unemployment was at a comparatively low 
level. (14) Moreover, even though they m i g h t  officially be classified as labourers, 
maay of the strikers were daing jobs which required a degree o f  skill. During the 
dairy strike, for example, Die Tsansvaler commented: 
1 
It will be anything but easy to replace the milkboys. 
A Native who does not know the town needs about thme 
weeks to learn his round. (15) 
To force those who had not joined the strike to cease work, the meat and dairy workers 
patrolled the streets in bands armed with sticks, lengths of plank and knobkerries. (16) 
Violent scenes ensued. The clay strikers surrounded their factory ei&t hundsed strong. 
mey refused entry to the works to customers who wanted 
to collect bricks. One lorry which dared to go in wag 
stoned. The police could do nothing, When Die Transvaler's 
reporter approached them in a car they suddenly charged 
towards h i s ~  with a shout and waving of sticks. Our reporter 
decided that he had seen enough and retreated to a safe 
distance. The Natives presumably thought that the car 
contained customers or police. (17) 
The success of violent picketing depended upon the a~xthoritiesr reluctance 
to use all the repressi-i~e force at their command. No one was killed in Johannesburg 
during December 1942. One presumes that the need for black support for the war effort 
made the goverwnent reluctant to be seen shooting black strikers dead, The most severe 
police action in Johamesburg took place in the second half of the month, during the 
strikes of wholesale mid retail meat workers. (18) Several workers were arrested, 
convicted of riotous behaviour and given up to two months' imprisonment. On 28th 
December - after the strikes in Johannesburg had subsided - panicky troops shot 
sixteen blacks dead in a riot over wages at the Pretoria municipal compound. The 
government expressed regret and appointed a coamission,which condemned the shootings 
and recommended the payment of compensation. 
Most of the Johannesburg strikes were ended within a day or so after 
negotiations had begun between employers, the Labour Department and black union 
officials. Union officials would persuade strikers to resume work while the union 
negotiated on their behalf. The armed mobs of strikers were consequently removed from 
the streets wi.thout the authori+,ies having to use force. The black union leadership 
plwed a far more prominent role in settling the December 1942 strikes than it did in 
bringing them about, In a number of industries - e.g. meat and iron and steel - the 
union leaders were less militant than the rank and file. During the meat workers' 
strike (14th ~ecember) their secretary, W. A. R. Mokoena, was initially nowhere to be 
found. When he did turn up, he was heckled and jeered when he urged the strikers to 
go back to work. Within two months his career as a union leader was at an end: the 
discovery that he had been embezzling union funds completed his discrediting in the 
eyes of the workers. (19) After a threat of strike action in the third week of 
December, the employers in the iron and steel industry offered an extra 3/- er week 
for labourers and j/g for semi-skilled on the existing wages of 21/- and 24p. At a 
general meeting in January 1943 rank and file workers protested that they were starving 
and demanded immediate action to win 40/- per week. But the union leadership prevailed 
upon the workers for the sake of the war effort to refrain from striking while it 
attempted to negotiate a further increase. (20) 
hractly what wage increases resulted from the strikes? Municipal, clay, 
mining timber, water and power workers demanded paynent in terns of Wage Determination 
105: all but power were successful; the wage increases appear to have been extended 
to a total of 21,000 municipal workers and 15,000 clay workers. The dairy workers 
obtained the introduction of their suspended wage determination (which laid d.own a 
minimum wage of only 23/3 per week). Demands for 40/- per week or more were made by 
meat, dairgr, mineral water and some municipal workers; but none of these were g~anted. 
Because of their close ties with the gold mining industry, the power workers, 
wage demand was referred to the Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission appointed in 
Febmry 1943. The appoinbent of this commission was very important in that it 
represented a departure from the earlier policy of refusing any wage increase to mine 
workers. The miners had taken no part in the strikes, except for five hundred who came 
out early in January 1943. (21) But the fact that the December l942 strikers were 
largely migrant labourers made it seem likely that the migrant labourers on the mines 
would soon come out on strike en masse unless something were done. The commission made 
m ehustive investigation of what the mines could skffordu and reported in lbrch 
1944, recommending a wage increase for the miners of approximately 16/- per month. 
Out of solicitude for the capitalists, the government reduced the actual wage increase 
that was paid to about 10/10 per month. (22) It ignored complaints from the African 
Mine Workers 1 Union that even 16/- per month was too little. For the power workers, 
the commission had recommended inclusion in Wage Detemination l05 on the grounds that 
a large proportion were permanently urbanized. The government refused to implement 
this, accepting the employers! contention that,because two power stations were situated 
next to mines (collieries), 
if any substantial increase in rates of pay were 
accorded to the V.F.P. Native employees it could 
not but have a very serious effect on the Nine 
Native labourers. (23) 
From the official point of view, the commission served as an effective delaying tactic. 
The strike wave fizzled out after the promulgation of M a r  Measure 145 on. 
19th December 1942. This raised the maximum penalty- for taking part in or instigating 
a strike to a E500 fine or three years imprisonment, a vast increase on previous 
penalties. Black unions could now ask the Minister of Labour to appoint an arbitrator 
to consider their demands. If the massive increase in penalties for striking was the 
"stick" to keep the black workers in order, the arbitration machinery was the "carrotf1. 
The huge maximum penalty was evidently intended for use against union leaders rather 
than ordinasy workers, providing the former with a strong incentive to hold their 
followers back from strike action. Arbitrators were in practice always members of 
the Wage Board, but since the arbitration machinery bypassed the Wage Board's slow 
procedure of hearing evidence, collecting statistics, calculating profitability and. 
considering objections, it made it possible for particularly militant groups of black 
workers to be quickly appeased by wage increases (e.g. the speed with which the coal 
trade workers were awarded an increase after the strike of June 1944). Since the 
appointment of arbitrators was absolutely at the Ministerrs discretion, weaker unions 
could simply be kept waiting. 
After the December l942 strikes, black union officials received an increased 
depee of informal recognition from employers in commerce and industry anxious to 
prevent unrest among their workers. The nature of the relationship which developed is 
well illustrated by the record of a meeting between the African Cement Workers, Union 
and Pretoria Portland Cement CO in March 1943. Management stated that it 
would not recognize a Native Trade Union until 
such time as the &vernment recognised it. (24) 
But it agreed to permit union organizers to enter the compa3l;y's property and hold 
meetings (subject to prior notice), to consider representations made by the union on 
behalf of the workers and to allow one of the workers to act as shop steward. 
The General Mamger also stressed the fact that 
the Company would look to the union for collaboration 
in preventing disputes arising as a result of the 
mischiev~us activities of irresponsible persons. (25) 
Three other industries in which essentially similar management-union relationships 
are known to have developed are clay, iron and steel, and power. (26) Gana Makabeni, 
CNETU chairman, was comended by the Nine Wages Commission for holding the power 
workers back while the commission was considering their demands. On Makabeni's role 
the Progressive Trade Union Group commented in mid-1945 that 
The VFP strike was a challenge to the cheap labour 
policy of the Chamber of fines. The success would 
have had repercussions on the whole mining industry 
and, powerless to do aaything by itself, the Government 
had to employ somebody to fDISCIPLINEt the workers. (27) 
(The Progressive Trade Union Group was a small group of black union leaders formed 
during 1944 by the Johannesburg Trotskyist group, the Workers' International League, 
to campaign within CNETU against the leadershipls lack of militancy.) 
l'othing on -the scale of the December 1942 strike wave took pla,ce for the 
rest of the war, althow there was quite a large number of stoppages. (28) Four of 
the largest of these took place in 1944. On 21st January 2,300 power workers struck 
over the delay in publishing the Mine Wages Conmission report. (They went back to 
work after a massive government show of force .) On 5th June 1,100 coal trade workers 
struck for hi&er wages, as did 350 baking workers on 7th July. In both cases the 
strikers were asrested, but the charges were later withdrawn and wage increases 
conceded. The strike of 1,900 milling workers on 11th September at one stage appeared 
to have been defeated, after many strikers had been replaced by fresh labour. But in 
the en6 the workers were granted a wage increase. It is also necessary to mention 
the Alexanllra bus boycotts of 1943 and 1944 and the success of the commercial 
distributive workers early in 1944 in obtaining a substantial wage increase without 
strike action. 
A detailed discussion of these disputes is not possible here. (29) One point 
which I do wish to stress is that, had the workers of the gold mining and iron and 
steel industries come out on strike in 1944, they would have made those strikes that 
did take place look small. Why didn't the~r? In gold mining the Lansdowne Commission 
kept the workers quiet for a year without any wage increase, as they waited for the 
Commission's report, Something similar happened in iron and steel, with a Wage Board 
investigation which began in June 1943 and was aborted a year later. (30) What is 
remarkable is that, by late 1944, the hopes of the workers in these two key industries 
for substantial wage increases had been dashed, yet no strike action took place until 
mid-1946, when in both cases it was defeated. (31) 
Late in 1944 at least two unsuccessful attempts were made to bring about 
large-scale strike action on the Witwatersrand. At a conference of the African Mine 
Workers' Union, Senator Basner recalled two years later, 
over 1000 delegates from different shafts on the 
WZtwatersrand were present. They wanted ... to 
strike there and then ... and on the other hand 
you had officials who wanted to know whether we 
had exhausted all channels of ne,pciation for 
coming to an amicable settlement. (32) 
In September, when the milling strikersr defeat appeared imminent, the Progressive 
Trade Union Group called for a general strike on the Witwatersrand. 
me major reasons for the failure of the black unions to confront the 
government at this stage were eviciently their fear of the repression they might 
provoke and their reluctance to risk ending the informal co-operation which they were 
receiving from some employers and the Labour Department. 
Two other factors deserve particular mention: the role of the Communist 
Party and the class background of the black union leadership. 
The Party had a general policy of preferring to settle disputes by 
negotiation and opposing strikes, except as a last resort, because of the dwge they 
did .to the war effort. (33) Individual Party members can be picked out who definitely 
played a strike-breaking role, e.g. R. Fleet, Secretary of the Trades and Labour 
Councills Johannesburg Local Committee, who claimed in September l944 that it was he 
who had persuaded the black union leaders involved to call off the planned general 
strike. (34) However, the Party certainly had no monopoly of non-militant union 
leaders, as was shown, for example, by the ignominious behaviour of C. F. Phoffu (one 
of the leading figures in the Progressive Trade Union ~roup) during the strikes in the 
woodworking industry in late 1945. (35) 
Black union officials appear on the whole to have been men of above average 
education. Such men were required to negotiate with employers and officials and take 
up complaints about the evasion of workers' legal rigbts. In considering why these 
people becane union officials one should bear in mind that the career opportunities 
for blacks of above-average education who aspired to a "middle class" life-style were 
very limited. (36) People who became union leaders at least partly for career 
reasons, lacking in real political commitment, might have been expected to divert union 
funds for personal use, to avoid any confrontation with the state which might lead to 
their being sent to jail, m d  to look for other jobs when official policy towards black 
unions turned hostile in the late 1940s. The evidence suggests that many, although far 
from all, black union leaders were of this type. (37) 
Black trade unionism in South Africa has never regaired the numerical 
proportions which it reached during the Second hTorld War. But the unions' rapid growth 
contained the seeds of its own decline. They were fatally dependent on official 
co-operation, which reached the level it did because of the particular economic and 
political situation created by the war; it diminished after the war, when the need to 
use unions to hold the black workers in check was no longer so pressing; when the 
Nationalistscme to power in 1948, all official co-operation with black unions ceased. 
One may speculate that, had the war-time unions been more militant, this would have 
provoked severe state repression but might, on the other hand, have created a lasting 
rank and file base for the union movement. 
It is not difficult to draw an analogy with the present situation: there 
are genuinely militant black unions which the government has extensively persecuted 
and may soon try to suppress completely; there are also elements - e.g. the leadership 
of the National Union of Clothing Workers - who have adopted a much less militant line 
and explicitly repudiated any association with radical political change in South Africa. 
It is the latter elements which the government will seek to build upon when it announces 
its lonpawaited scheme for giving legal recognition to black worker organizations. To 
enhance South Africa's image abroad, a ~ery large number of black workers may well be 
press-ganged into parallel unions, or whatever other form of organization the government 
prescribes. Although the nominal membership of such bodies would be large, their 
abili-ty to advance the economic and political interests of the rank and file workers 
be even more limited than that of the black unions of the Second World War. (38) 
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